

PUBLISHED 08/08/2026

INTRODUCTION

From July 8-10 this year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Australia, his third official visit. The outcomes of this visit range from matters including defence, energy, critical minerals, trade, education, and numerous other matters, building on deals made during previous visits.

Among these are issues I'll briefly touch on towards the end, but there's something else I want to focus on in this second Eureka Digest – immigration, diaspora politics, and foreign influence. This serves as just one part of a broader web of issues surrounding immigration, foreign influence, and cultural segregation in Australia which I'll build on in this and future articles.

THE BJP AND DIASPORA DIPLOMACY

Below is a QR code to a January 2017 issue of *The Nationalist*, the official internal publication and magazine of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) ruling party of India, of which Modi is the leader and current prime minister.



SCAN TO READ THE MAGAZINE

What is of particular note here is the contents of pages 27-28, titled *Modi's Diaspora Diplomacy: Mobilizing India's Dynamic Expatriates*.

Feel free to read the full section yourself with the link, but here is a basic summary with my own added analysis.

The section starts by outlining a once-suspicious attitude with which Indian people viewed diaspora populations – as having “somehow betrayed the motherland” by emigrating for better opportunities. This is a fairly common feeling among populations of developing nations, especially when it comes to the emigration of educated professionals trained at home. This case in particular, in the context of colonial and early post-colonial India, represented an instinctual response to the economic phenomenon of ‘brain drain’, where a developing country in the imperial periphery trains its people, and then loses those skills, which could be employed at home for development, by emigrating to a developed country in the imperial core.

It then goes on to point towards a change in attitudes as the Indian diaspora has grown up to 2017 to roughly 25 million people, second only to the Chinese diaspora at the time – the Indian diaspora has since eclipsed China’s in the last decade, growing to 35.4 million people as of early 2026. The change in attitudes also appears to correspond to India’s changing place in the world, developing from a former British colony in the imperial periphery, to a growing regional power in South Asia in its own right, becoming a constituent founding member of BRICS alongside Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa.

It is the next part which is particularly troubling amid the growing Indian population in Australia and elsewhere – that the Modi government views the Indian diaspora “as a valuable component of India’s foreign policy, **in much the same way the Jewish diaspora in the US influences international opinion and policy on Israel**”.

Uh oh.

Before I go further, I want to be very clear with a disclaimer to preempt any potential accusations of racism or spreading anti-Indian or antisemitic tropes – this analysis does not intend to disparage ethnically Indian or Jewish individuals living in Australia, nor those of any other ethnicity. This is not a matter of race or ethnicity as some others who might discuss these topics will assert – it is about loyalty, as will be clear by the end of this article. I am not suggesting that Australian citizens of Indian or Jewish background are automatically or inherently disloyal on that basis. Individuals have agency beyond the colour of their skin, their religion, or their cultural background.

With that disclaimer out of the way, let's move on. The remainder of the section primarily focuses on specific outcomes that have emerged from Modi's diaspora outreach and mobilisation efforts with respect to trade, investment, and other areas, of which the deals made with the Albanese government here in Australia are just one part.

“MONOCULTURALISM”

In a speech at the National Press Club in June, One Nation leader Pauline Hanson made the following statement on the matter of immigration and multiculturalism in Australia:

*“We cannot be a multicultural society. We are a multiracial society, but we must be **monocultural**. Australians must live under the one cultural umbrella.”*

This statement came amidst One Nation's unprecedented rise in federal polling (with some polls placing them on equal footing with Labor and eclipsing the Coalition) and naturally caused significant backlash nationally, though on numerous occasions, Hanson was forced to clarify what she meant by 'monoculturalism'. The first instance of this was

during the FIFA World Cup 2026 which has only recently concluded, where the 26-man Australian Socceroos team, coming from numerous cultural and ethnic backgrounds, including some former refugees, was described by Hanson on the floor of the Senate as representing her vision of a monocultural Australia – “people from different backgrounds, and cultures, and nations, all wearing green and gold and representing one nation, under one flag, and succeeding under the same set of rules”.

I would implore you to take a look at this YouTube video I watched on the subject:



SCAN TO WATCH THE VIDEO

The video is from a critic of Hanson, but it illustrates essentially what has happened here regarding how Hanson is defining ‘monoculturalism’. One point of note in the video is that the closest you’ll find to a “pure monoculture” in the world... is North Korea. Which should give you an indication of what a real monoculture would necessitate in practice – totalitarian conformity to a state-determined “acceptable” culture.

Repeatedly, Hanson clarified her definition of ‘monoculturalism’ by effectively describing multiculturalism, something which has been pointed out by countless journalists and pundits by now. I’m going to be charitable to Hanson’s clarification here for the sake of argument, however much her recent firestorm interview with British extremist Tommy Robinson where she claimed Australia’s immigration ills started with the end of the White Australia policy casts doubt on whether her civic framing is genuine, whether her comments with Robinson were a Freudian slip revealing what she actually wants, or

whether she's just painfully inconsistent given her seeming lack of a coherent worldview beyond surface-level populist opportunism.

I'll also add that Hanson's ongoing holiday around Europe where the interview took place appears to be funded by Gina Rinehart, Australia's most prominent comprador oligarch whose financial interests are anything but Australia First, as I discussed in the previous Eureka Digest (though whether Gina is funding the trip is unconfirmed, it seems likely given her shared dinner with Hanson in Italy).

Back to the video, however, I noticed a critical gap – one which seems to make sense given the creator's apparent centre-left bias per my own estimation, and which has also been broadly left out of the discourse. What many Australians are noticing is that what we have in Australia at present is not multiculturalism in the sense that it was originally conceived either – rather, what we have is a status quo of **state-sanctioned cultural segregation** which the major parties and the broader left have mistaken for multiculturalism.

THE DECLINE OF WHITE AUSTRALIA AND THE RISE OF MULTICULTURALISM

In 1973, the Minister for Immigration for the Whitlam Labor government, A. J. Grassby, presented a paper to a Melbourne symposium titled *A multi-cultural society for the future*.



SCAN TO READ THE PAPER

This is generally considered the founding document of multiculturalism in Australia, and is often ignored in contemporary discourse surrounding multiculturalism, despite how much of a light it can shine on the course of events that have transpired since. Before describing the steps that were taken by the Whitlam government in these critical first years of multiculturalism, it's necessary to first place the situation into its historical context, including the conditions Whitlam inherited from the decades of Liberal Party leadership.

I could of course go back to the inception of the White Australia policy, however, what is most relevant to the context here only requires going back to the Chifley Labor government in 1945, which established the Federal Department of Immigration, commissioning a report which found that Australia urgently needed a larger population for defence and development. The target set by the government was 1% annual population growth via immigration, often denoted by the slogan “populate or perish”.

Over the next 20 years to 1965, roughly 2 million immigrants arrived to Australia, with around 40% being migrants from Britain and Ireland, and the remainder being mostly other Europeans, including Italians, Greeks, Germans, Dutch, Poles, and Yugoslavs. The official policy at this time was one of ‘Anglo-conformist’ assimilation – expecting that newcomers would adopt wholesale the culture of the Anglo-Celtic majority, including giving up cultural customs, languages, etc. At this time, the state’s role was limited to teaching English and directing people into the workforce.

However, by the late 1950s, the assimilationist approach was visibly failing – the cultural distinctiveness of European migrant populations wasn't fading. Rather, what was emerging instead was a situation where migrant communities formed ethnic and cultural enclaves in capital cities. As a result of the failure of assimilation, the Menzies Liberal government quietly shifted towards a policy of 'integration' – essentially a softer version of assimilation that allowed migrants to maintain their cultural heritage while encouraging participation in broader Australian society. However, this shift was largely rhetorical, lacking any investment in the infrastructure necessary to facilitate proactive integration.

It was the subsequent Holt Liberal government which made the first concrete steps towards dismantling the White Australia policy with the *Migration Act 1966*, replacing racial criteria with a merit-based system partly assessing the ability of migrants to integrate along with qualifications. The "populate or perish" rhetoric persisted as before, but applicants were tested on their ability to integrate rather than on race. The last vestiges of White Australia were dismantled by the Whitlam government with the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975*. As a result of the decline of White Australia, non-European immigration began rising, from 746 in 1966 to 2,696 in 1971.

By 1971, around one in three Australians was a migrant or the child of a migrant. While the population remained overwhelmingly European in origin at over 90% per the 1961 census, the dismantling of White Australia naturally meant that the source countries of immigration were becoming increasingly diverse. Australia was shifting from an Anglo-Celtic settler-colony expecting assimilation, to a more diverse society that lacked any coherent framework for how to actively encourage civic integration. Migrants had clustered into ethnic enclaves, turning inward and forming "micro-societies", hardening rather than dissolving ethnic

identities. The passive egalitarianism of the previous ‘integration’ policy had in reality fostered inequality and ethnic and cultural segregation due to the lack of state support for integration.

These were the conditions inherited by the Whitlam government, which Grassby, as Minister for Immigration, was tasked with addressing in his 1973 paper, *A multi-cultural society for the future*. In the paper, Grassby articulated multiculturalism as **civic integration**, with active state investment in social interaction and community infrastructure, within which he coined the concept of a “**family of the nation**”, where diverse members of society commit to a common societal good.

The policy outcomes which this original framework produced under Whitlam, and partially continued under the subsequent Fraser Liberal government, included cutting migration numbers from ~185,000 in 1969-70, down to ~80,000-100,000 by 1974-75, to reduce the intake of new migrants and consolidate the integration infrastructure capacity for the existing migrant population; establishing Task Forces in every state to examine settlement problems; funding Migrant Education Centres and provided free English language programs; maintaining free university education and centralised wage-fixing that protected migrant workers; investing in public housing; and supporting community organisations that fostered cross-cultural interaction.

Grassby’s framework of multiculturalism was therefore active, not passive, and aimed at creating the conditions that would enable the integration of peoples of diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds under a united, Australian civic identity.

So, what happened? What went so wrong? The answer – as it is with so many of the problems faced in contemporary Australia – is neoliberalism.

THE NEOLIBERAL TURN AND THE DECLINE OF MULTICULTURALISM

In 1983, the Labor Party reentered government under Prime Minister Bob Hawke after the eight-year tenure of the Fraser government. Preceding the 1983 federal election, Hawke and the Australian Council of Trade Unions signed the Prices and Incomes Accord, which laid the groundwork for the neoliberal turn in Australia. This was also the moment that Labor betrayed its founding mandate to the Australian working class, but that is a topic for another day.

What took place in the subsequent decades was a systematic dismantling of the guardrails put in place under the Whitlam government to facilitate civic integration. The norm of centralised wage-fixing was replaced with enterprise bargaining under the Keating government (with the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993) and the subsequent Howard government (with the Workplace Relations Act 1996), destroying the wage floor for workers that lacked collective bargaining power, disproportionately migrant workers in low-paid sectors, all while union density more broadly collapsed with the progressive offshoring of Australian manufacturing, a point we'll return to in a moment.

The Dawkins reforms under Hawke in 1987-89 restructured higher education and introduced HECS, with subsequent significant cuts to TAFE funding under Howard, making what was once free and which had served as the primary vehicle of civic integration for second-generation migrants into a debt-gated barrier. From the mid-1990s onwards, public housing stock was privatised, management outsourced, and new construction stagnated, dismantling the urban planning that aimed to prevent the very spatial segregation of migrant communities

that Grassby warned about in his paper. These housing policy trends have also contributed significantly to Australia's present housing crisis.

Returning to the subject of manufacturing, the progressive removal of protective tariffs during the 1980s and 1990s led to domestic manufacturing industries being hollowed out and offshored to developing countries with cheaper labour like China, leading to a collapse in manufacturing jobs, which were largely replaced with service-sector jobs such as hospitality, retail, and later the gig economy – low-union, low-wage, low-stability sectors which failed to serve the same function for civic integration which the unionised factory floor once had. The working class was atomised.

Successive budgets across both major parties cut funding for community services, including libraries, community centres, childcare, public spaces, and community health, destroying the physical venues where cross-cultural social interaction occurred most naturally – community halls, public pools, TAFE campuses, union meetings, etc., all while centralised algorithmic social media platforms emerged to fill the vacuum starting in the 2000s, replacing civic participation with engagement-optimised digital environments that incentivise tribalism and undermine cross-group interaction.

All of this was only exacerbated by perpetually increasing immigration numbers, net overseas migration increasing from ~98,000 under Hawke's first term, to over 700,000 per term by the late 2000s, to over 1.15 million under the current Albanese government, the only anomaly being the dip to 272,600 under the Morrison Liberal government, caused by COVID-era necessity, not policy choice. Under Whitlam, migration was managed through the lens of integration capacity, aiming to ensure social cohesion remained intact. Since the neoliberal turn, migration has become nothing more than an economic input – artificial

GDP inflation, cheap labour, filling skills shortages resulting from a lack of investment in TAFE.

This is where I need to add some additional context on one of the drivers of continued mass immigration – a point which the cowardly neoliberal establishment constantly belabours whenever substantial cuts to immigration numbers are brought up, yet constantly makes no substantive effort to fix – the birth rate. In 1976, Australia's Total Fertility Rate (TFR) fell to 2.0, below the replacement rate of 2.1, and has dropped further to a current TFR of 1.481. The initial fall below replacement rate was due partly to the increased availability of contraception, women's participation in the workforce, delayed marriages, and smaller family norms, while the economic pressure of the inflation crisis of the time also contributed.

The neoliberal turn entrenched further decline in the birth rate through fiscal austerity. Increasing housing unaffordability, wage stagnation, HECS debts, defunded childcare, and the atomisation caused by the degradation of social infrastructure alongside the rise of algorithmic social media, have contributed to making childrearing economically punishing and lasting relationships harder to form. At the same time, third- and fourth-wave feminism shifted the feminist discourse from the motherism of the second-wave, and the demand for economic conditions that made motherhood viable, towards anti-natalism and cultural division (which has been met with a corresponding rise of inter-gender animosity among both males and females).

In saying all this, the drop in TFR up to now would only require net migration of around ~250,000 annually, whereas the actual intake is far in excess of what's needed to cover the demographic gap, so while demographic replacement is a justification rooted in a legitimate phenomenon, it is not the primary driver.

This has left us with a worsening status quo of precisely the kind of cultural segregation which Grassby warned would emerge without the guardrails he and the Whitlam government had put in place. And the establishment wonders why everything is falling apart and the people are responding with reactionary instincts channelled through populist charlatans like Pauline Hanson. Though it should also be evident by this point that Hanson was incorrect in her diagnosis on Tommy Robinson's podcast: Australia's present immigration ills did not start with the end of the White Australia policy under Holt and Whitlam – they began later, with the neoliberal turn under Hawke, Keating, and Howard. I'll return again to Hanson in the last section of this article, but for now, there's one more dimension to address which has been noticed disproportionately by the dissident right than by the left – foreign influence.

CULTURAL SEGREGATION AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE

Australia today faces almost the exact same dilemma which Grassby and the Whitlam government faced in their time – migrants failing to integrate into common society and instead becoming insulated within ethnic and cultural enclaves and ghettos. As we've seen by this point, this status quo can be blamed almost entirely upon economic factors emerging from the neoliberal turn, with the rise of third- and fourth-wave cultural feminism being an additional factor which exacerbated the declining birth rate.

However, the kind of cultural segregation we see today is arguably significantly worse than that which was inherited by Whitlam and Grassby. In the interest of brutal honesty without holding back for the sake of 'political correctness', one contributor is the increased diversity

of ethnicities and cultures seen in Australian society as a result of the end of the racial and ethnic discrimination within the immigration system that characterised the White Australia era.

This degree of diversity had only just begun to be introduced in the 1970s as the White Australia policy was being dismantled – today’s ethnic and cultural diversity is the result of decades without such discriminatory immigration restrictions. At least during the White Australia era, insofar as there was ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity within Australian society, it was almost entirely confined to European ethnic diasporas which still had varying degrees of similarity to the culture of the Anglo-Celtic majority – Christianity as dominant religion, a high degree of shared customs and ethics emerging from a common Greco-Roman-Germanic Christian cultural heritage – similarities which diverge considerably once you move beyond Europe and North America and start looking to Asia or Africa.

Another contributor is very clearly the immigration numbers being orders of magnitude higher than those of pre-Whitlam governments, which as we’ve established, is far beyond the level required simply to maintain stable population growth.

The third contributor which adds a qualitatively new dimension to today’s status quo, is that the degree of segregation and insularity among ethnic diaspora communities in Australia has opened potential vectors for foreign influence, vulnerabilities which have been seized upon by foreign states.

A key manner in which these vectors have manifested is through diaspora civil society organisations, some of the largest and most prolific including the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ), the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC), and the Federation of Chinese Associations of Sydney (FOCAS). The FOCAS

has come under scrutiny in past years already for serving as a potential channel for foreign influence by the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the United Front Work Department (UFWD), being forcibly listed under the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme in 2023. Many of these organisations have received government funding for various purposes including community security and cultural preservation, as well as privileged positions for government consultation on matters pertaining to diaspora communities as so-called ‘peak ethnic bodies’.

More recently, amid the Israeli genocide in Gaza and the broader Middle East crisis, the ECAJ has come under considerable public scrutiny on both sides of politics alongside lobbying organisations like the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) and the Australian Jewish Association (AJA) as vectors of Israeli foreign influence in Australia, particularly with the appointment of Jillian Segal as Special Envoy to Combat Antisemitism, who had conflicts of interest relating to her role within the ECAJ even after taking the role. Of course, while the increased scrutiny is only recent, Israel has been the single largest case study in foreign influence across the “Western world” for decades, whether through lobbies like AIJAC in Australia or AIPAC in the US, diaspora civil society organisations like the ECAJ, or through Christian Zionist organisations such as Christians United for Israel (CUFI) in the US.

Civil society organisations for the Indian diaspora in Australia are by comparison more diffuse and diverse, though every one of these organisations also serves as a potential vector for foreign influence by India, a fact which has been recognised by Modi’s BJP and acted upon, explicitly citing the example of Israel using Jewish communities around the world for foreign influence.

Again, citing the existence of these vectors or the strategy of foreign states to use them for influence should not be taken to imply that all members of these ethnic diasporas are necessarily disloyal or that there is any kind of grand conspiratorial concerted effort by the major parties in Australia and foreign governments to import foreign influence intentionally. Without any concrete evidence implying a grander conspiracy, the facts as we should understand is simply that these vectors exist as a result of a combination of demonstrable economic and cultural factors, and that foreign governments are simply acting in their own interests for the attainment of soft power in other countries by exploiting these vectors.

Of course, it should be noted that while the FOCAS was listed as a foreign influence organisation, the ECAJ and Zionist lobbies have not been so. This is a clear example of favouritism towards organisations which serve the interest of ‘ally’ nations as opposed to those serving the interest of ‘adversary’ nations. This is why the single largest and most entrenched foreign influence network in Australia is not any of these ethnic diaspora networks, but that which serves American imperialist interests in Australia, whether that be the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia (AmCham) as a business lobby for hundreds of US companies with trillions in US funding, the American Australian Association (AAA) and its federally funded think tank arm alongside the University of Sydney, the United States Studies Centre (USSC), or the Australian American Leadership Dialogue as another private lobby.

A noticeable fact is that much of this foreign influence, outside of the Zionist network in recent years, goes broadly unnoticed or ignored on the traditionally anti-imperialist far-left in Australia, meanwhile, more of it is recognised and called out by the dissident right-wing, mostly by those who exist outside Hansonite circles, such as the Australian Lobby Group and some Australian republican organisations. Why? I suspect

this is because much of the contemporary left in Australia lacks any nationalist or patriotic flavour, and instead adopts a dogmatic framework of either liberal internationalism or proletarian internationalism, so foreign influence doesn't matter too much (even Albanese's "progressive patriotism" is ultimately just liberal internationalism dressed in the language of liberal civic nationalism). The small exceptions are more patriotic-leaning Marxist-Leninist organisations like the Eureka Initiative – however, they are campist and willing to turn a blind eye to Chinese influence, so they suffer from the same problem as the establishment, just in the opposite direction.

So, with all this out of the way, what steps can we actually take to solve these compounding problems of cultural segregation and foreign influence?

A FORK IN THE ROAD

Rather than simply starting with my own policy proposals, I'd like to begin by looking at the variety of policy proposals that exist currently. But before that, let's establish the chain of causation proposed in this article up to this point:

The neoliberal turn systematically dismantled the Whitlam-era guardrails designed to ensure civic integration: centralised wage-fixing was replaced with enterprise bargaining, removing wage protections; free education became debt-gated through HECS; protective tariffs were removed, offshoring manufacturing and atomising the working class into a service economy; and physical social spaces were defunded just as algorithmic social media filled the vacuum, encouraging tribalism over interaction.

Simultaneously, immigration policy shifted from integration capacity to economic input, with intake escalating from ~80,000 under Whitlam to over 1.1 million annually under Albanese — far exceeding the ~250,000 needed to cover the demographic gap. The Total Fertility Rate's fall below replacement in 1976 was further exacerbated by neoliberal austerity and cultural feminism's anti-natalist turn, creating a self-reinforcing loop where declining fertility justified more migration, while the resulting infrastructure strain further depressed birth rates. The dismantled guardrails produced cultural segregation, which spawned ethnic civil society organisations granted privileged status as 'peak ethnic bodies' — vectors for foreign influence selectively exploited by China, Israel, India, and potentially other countries.

With that out of the way, what are the proposals which have been offered by various actors across the political spectrum in Australia to solve these problems?

Well, for the major parties and much of the mainstream left, the response has been... largely a big, juicy nothingburger. The foreign influence problem has been largely ignored unless it serves American geopolitical interests (see China), there has been no significant effort to raise the TFR, continued dogmatic adherence to free trade and neoliberal orthodoxy, and a variety of forms of internationalist and globalist ideology producing an impetus for continued mass immigration, with anyone who objects being shouted down as a racist, a fascist, or any other number of colourful terms. There are exceptions on the left where social democratic proposals are made to solve the earlier parts of the causal chain above, but this largely remains constrained by neoliberal economic presuppositions, degrowth ideology, and an adherence to open borders, which means the immigration overload factor is not addressed but is in fact worsened further.

Now we come back to the elephant in the room – Pauline Hanson and One Nation. One Nation’s solution is largely limited to an immigration policy which is largely vague, ill-informed, and up to interpretation unless Hanson herself clarifies when confronted in Parliament, by reporters, or online, in the process of which she often contradicts herself, indicating a largely vibes-based opportunism more concerned with appealing to her base than with actually offering solutions. The wording of the policy has changed since I addressed it in an article a couple years back on my first Substack, the Vanguard Digest, where the wording was eerily similar to the White Australia policy, which is another possible red flag.

Though to be charitable to Hanson for the sake of argument, I’ll take her at her word that she does not seek to reintroduce the White Australia policy. In that case, her proposed solution is largely limited to reducing net overseas migration (which can only be guaranteed by cutting residency and visa programs, since the NOM total includes citizen departures and arrivals, as well as tourism), deporting overstayers, illegal immigrants, and noncitizens guilty of a crime, increasing the waiting period for citizenship eligibility, and a largely vague refusal of entry to “migrants from nations known to foster extremist ideologies”, which per own public rhetoric can be assumed to translate to a Trump-style Muslim ban in practice, since she and many of her supporters, particularly those of a Zionist persuasion, unfairly generalise to equate Islam with terrorism or extremism.

Which brings us to the fact that Hanson largely doesn’t touch the matter of foreign influence or lobbying, which is an odd omission for a self-proclaimed nationalist party, until you look deeper and notice her personal relationships with Gina Rinehart, a pro-Trump comprador oligarch, and David Adler, leader of the far-right Zionist lobby, the Australian Jewish Association, and her own open endorsement of the

Israeli far-right, manifested on multiple occasions by her entering Parliament adorning an Israeli flag scarf. And even her immigration restrictions are paired with numerous other anti-worker, deregulationist, and fiscally conservative policies that don't even pretend to solve the earlier links in the chain.

Of course, the right wing in Australia is not a monolith, and there are other groups who propose a range of other solutions, including filling the gap left by Hanson on the foreign influence point. The Australian Lobby Group in particular has championed a ban on foreign lobbying. The variety of solutions on the immigration front range from proposals for immigration reductions, to a temporary moratorium, to mass deportation regimes of various degrees of extremity and violation of due process depending on persuasion, to explicit White Australia revivalism and stripping citizenship based on race. I'm not even going to entertain for a moment the insignificant minority that likely exists which proposes worse.

Beyond a moratorium, I generally view proposals involving mass deportations, violations of due process rights, or reviving the White Australia policy, as a largely unnecessary and reactionary overcorrection. But the throughline largely remains that these right-wing proposals focus on immigration volume, with little focus on the earlier links in the chain, though the ALG in particular does have a particular economic nationalist streak which favours some degree of reindustrialisation, which does approach something reversing the impacts of deindustrialisation that came from the neoliberal turn, though I think it's largely insufficient and not directed enough towards the problem at hand.

So, with the alternatives out of the way, what should be done? What do I propose we do?

THE FUTURE OF MULTICULTURALISM

As mentioned in the previous section, the dilemma Australia faces today is largely similar to that which was faced by the Whitlam government and AJ Grassby, though the magnitude of the problem is disproportionately severe. I believe, therefore, that solving the problem today requires a solution which is more severe in proportion, though which still stops short of a reactionary overcorrection, and which aims to reestablish the guardrails which the Whitlam government put in place to ensure civic integration, with some additional measures to resolve the matter of foreign influence and potential dual loyalties, while addressing the symptoms. In other words, a pincer approach that hits every link in the chain at once.

1. We need a temporary moratorium on new permanent migration and most visas to give us time to catch up, restore and develop civil infrastructure and the necessary infrastructure for civic integration, including working and student visas (new applicants, not necessarily renewals), with the exception of those which are strictly economically necessary to fill high-priority skills, with a reintroduced focus on integration capacity. We also need to prioritise incentivising Australians, especially those who are currently unemployed, to train to fill skills shortages in the long-term to reduce reliance on immigration. For this, I propose the introduction of a Temporary Knowledge Transfer Visa scheme which aims to bring in a capped volume of highly-skilled workers from overseas to train Australians while working on a strictly temporary basis – current temporary working visa holders not pursuing permanent residency could

also be incentivised to switch to a TKT visa. This solves the mass immigration problem.

2. Establish a Public Works Army to serve as a federal job guarantee, consolidating public sector workers into one fluid labour force, allowing for occupation-switching within the public sector to fill priority jobs where needed and to mobilise and train the unemployed. The PWA is something I will expand on separately in future Eureka Digest articles and in the second Eureka Paper to be published in December this year, as it is more significant in scope than it might appear here. But the PWA would restore centralised wage-fixing, full employment, and labour protections for migrants and citizens alike.
3. Abolish HECS and restore state-funded free education, not just at the tertiary level, but at all levels, and integrate public tertiary and vocational education directly into the PWA, with increased funding to increase capacity. This restores the university and TAFE centre as a key node of civic integration for migrants.
4. Australia needs to reindustrialise to restore domestic supply chains for manufacturing. I propose a state-led rather than private sector-led reindustrialisation push and production subsidies in order to reduce or eliminate the need for tariffs which harm consumers, with the Public Works Army as a reindustrialisation workforce. This point will also be expanded upon in the second Eureka Paper in December, and restores the manufacturing sector as a key node of civic integration for migrant workers.
5. We need to restore and increase funding for maintaining and expanding physical social spaces, one of the core ways that civic integration happens organically, as well as restoring active

investment in free English language programs for migrants and foreign-born citizens to increase English fluency. On the social spaces front, I have one particularly radical proposal towards this end, but I'll leave that for another Eureka Digest, since it covers far more issues than just this.

6. We need to increase public housing construction in such a way that promotes and incentivises the relocation of migrants out of urban ethnic enclaves and into multi-ethnic communities where integration can take place. My proposal for this involves a robust Rural Revival program which aims to revitalise and develop rural and remote towns across Australia, along with incentives for citizens and migrants alike to move to rural and remote areas to decrease urban population density and reduce strain on urban infrastructure. This will solve the problem of ghettoisation.
7. Finally, we need to increase the Total Fertility Rate. This requires a robust, pro-natal family policy including the reintroduction of free childcare, increased and tiered child payments, a shorter working week, and longer parental leave for both parents, along with other steps, and the restoration of motherist feminism to reverse the anti-natalism of contemporary cultural feminism which has contributed to TFR decline.

These policies will restore the guardrails. However, the present status quo, with the proliferation of foreign influence, requires some additional steps:

- Ending the state recognition of diaspora civil society organisations as 'peak ethnic bodies'. The existence of these organisations is not inherently a problem – privileged access and funding by the government is.

- Introducing a multi-faceted ‘Treason Law’ criminalising material support for foreign interests, whether through bribery, paid lobbying, acting as a wilful intelligence agent, or doxxing methods, among other acts.
- Abolishing dual citizenship as the ultimate loyalty test – requiring all current dual citizens to either renounce their foreign citizenship or their Australian citizenship, with a sufficient grace period necessary to allow time for deliberation, consideration and preparation, after which dual citizens are automatically downgraded to permanent residency status, and requiring that new citizenship applicants renounce their foreign citizenship in order to attain Australian citizenship. This will of course not catch all potential foreign agents – the Treason Law is proposed to catch those who fall through the gaps.

Only with this suite of measures do I believe Australia can finally restore civic integration, social cohesion, and internal political sovereignty.

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